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THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION V. THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A SURVEY OF RECENT
FDA ENFORCEMENT
Gerald Masoudit and Christopher Pruitttt
INTRODUCTION
Congress has charged the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
with the task of "promot[ing] the public health" through various regu-
latory functions, one of which is assuring that regulated products are
not misbranded.' There is little debate about the importance of this
task: consumers and medical providers cannot make informed deci-
sions about regulated products without access to truthful, scientifically
accurate, and balanced product information. Subject to significant
debate, however, is the agency's performance of the task. While some
commentators have accused the agency of adopting anemic enforce-
ment policies, 2 a number have argued persuasively that many of the
agency's speech-related policies violate the First Amendment. 3 A
survey of recent developments illustrates that the frequency and mag-
nitude of such actions have grown more pronounced as the agency
increases its enforcement activities.
In the drug and medical device context, the FDA has recently
been involved in two cases, Allergan v. United States4 and United
t Mr. Masoudi is a partner at Covington & Burling LLP, where he serves as
co-chair of the food and drug practice group. He served as deputy chief counsel of the
Food and Drug Administration from 2004-05 and as chief counsel from 2007-09.
It Mr. Pruitt is an associate at Covington & Burling LLP in the food and
drug group.
' 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006).
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-597, FOOD
LABELING: FDA NEEDS TO BETTER LEVERAGE RESOURCES, IMPROVE OVERSIGHT, AND
EFFECTIVELY USE AVAILABLE DATA TO HELP CONSUMERS SELECT HEALTHY FOODS
(2008); Peter Lurie, DTC Advertising Harms Patients and Should be Tightly Regu-
lated, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 444, 444-50 (2009).
3 E.g., Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Con-
straints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151 (2008); Lars Noah, The Little Agency that
Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 901, 901-25 (2008).
4 Allergan v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 1, 2009).
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States. v. Caronia,s involving First Amendment challenges to particu-
larly aggressive-and likely unconstitutional-enforcement positions
regarding off-label promotion. The agency has also taken several oth-
er actions infringing on First Amendment rights, including a crack-
down on internet advertising through sponsored search links. 6 In the
food and supplement universe, FDA has taken several unduly restric-
tive, and likely unconstitutional, positions in both litigation and
enforcement letters regarding the use of health claims and nutrient
content claims. 7 The agency has also asserted various likely unconsti-
tutional positions in its enforcement of the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act.8
The agency's curtailment of constitutionally protected commer-
cial speech carries serious consequences. These range from the prac-
tical results of removing truthful (and useful) product communications
from the marketplace, as market players seek to avoid enforcement by
over-editing their own speech, to the more fundamental problem of
allowing a government bureaucracy to become a gatekeeper of
speech.
Compounding this problem is the lack of a meaningful way for
manufacturers to protect their constitutional rights. For most, litigation
is a not viable option. Manufacturers contesting enforcement actions
face heavy risks in the form of billion-dollar fines, Park doctrine (vi-
carious) liability, and exclusion and debarment from federal programs
and contracts.9 Prospective actions to enforce First Amendment rights
are equally challenging, especially when the agency does not fully
comply with adverse decisions.'o
These circumstances demonstrate the need for greater internal re-
view of agency policies for First Amendment compliance. To meet
this end, the agency should continue its initiative, begun in 2002, to
better conform its regulations and guidance documents to First
Amendment requirements. And perhaps more importantly, the agency
should immediately put into place a robust review process to screen
all speech-related enforcement actions for First Amendment com-
pliance.
No. 09-5006-CR (2d Cir. filed Apr. 22, 2010).
6 See infra Part II.A.iii-.iv.
7 See infra Part II.B.
8 See infra Part II.C.
9 See infra Part III.A.
"o See infra Part III.B.
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I. REGULATORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
BACKGROUND
A. FDA's Regulation of Drug, Device, Food, Supplement, and To-
bacco Promotion
FDA regulates a quarter of the United States economy "-ranging
from frozen pizza, eyeliner, and cigarettes, to animal drugs, cancer
medicines, and bandages. These various products are subject to differ-
ing levels of regulation and speech restrictions. Summarized below
are the regulatory bases for some of the more significant and contro-
versial speech restrictions that have been the subject of recent en-
forcement action.
1. Drugs
FDA has historically relied on claims made by a manufacturer to
determine whether the product at issue is a drug.12 The very definition
of "drug" under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)-
an "article intended" to perform various functions including the diag-
nosis or treatment of disease-is based on the speech of a manufac-
turer. 13 Indeed, FDA views a claim that positions an article of food as
a treatment for a disease as indication that the food should be consi-
dered a drug.' 4 For example, FDA found olive oil to be an unapproved
new drug following manufacturers' statements regarding the effects of
olive oil on heart disease and inflammation.
To be marketed commercially, human drugs must be approved
through one of several regulatory channels, meet the specifications of
an FDA over-the-counter (OTC) monograph,' 5 or fall within one of
" Top 10 "Things That Hill Staff Need to Know About FDA ", ALLIANCE FOR
A STRONGER FDA (Mar. 6, 2010), http://strengthenfda.org/2010/03/06/top-10-
%E2%80%9Cthings-that-hill-staff-need-to-know-about-fda%E2%80%9D/.
12 E.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2010) (describing how the agency evaluates the
intended use of an article to determine whether it is a drug); Nat'l Nutritional Foods
Ass'n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334-38 (2d Cir. 1977) (describing the legal standard
for evaluation of intended use).
' 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1994).
14 Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, Dir., Off. of Compliance Ctr for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Frank D. Patton, President, Pompeian, Inc., (Feb. 22,
2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm202828.htm
(contending that an olive oil manufacturer's statements regarding the effect of olive
oil on heart disease and inflammation rendered its products unapproved new drugs).
15 The OTC monographs provide a regulatory pathway to market certain
specified drugs without filing a new drug application or abbreviated new drug appli-
cation. See 21 C.F.R. § 330.10 (describing process for establishing monographs).
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several grandfather exceptions.16 The approval process can take sev-
eral forms. New drugs (compounds that are not generally recognized
as safe and effective) must be the subject of a new drug application
(NDA) or a biologics license application (BLA), both of which must
be supported by well-controlled clinical investigations demonstrating
safety and effectiveness.1 New uses of already-approved compounds
may be approved through abbreviated means, as can "generic" ver-
sions of already-approved drugs.'8 In approving a drug under an NDA
or BLA, FDA will approve a package insert (sometimes known as the
"PI" or "FDA-approved labeling"), the language of which is strictly
set forth by FDA.19
Perhaps the most well-known-and controversial-aspect of
FDA's speech regulations is the requirement that manufacturers limit
product claims to the specific indications FDA has approved and per-
mitted to appear in the product's FDA-approved labeling, regardless
of the drug's safety and efficacy for other uses. The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not expressly ban such "off-
label promotion"; instead the FDCA and FDA's implementing regula-
tions prohibit this practice in two ways. First, FDA may classify a
previously approved drug that is promoted in labeling for unapproved
alternative uses as an unapproved "new drug" within the meaning of
section 505(a) of the FDCA. 2 0 Because the drug is not approved for
the promoted off-label use, shipment of the product in interstate
commerce would violate Section 301(d) of the FDCA.2 1
Second, FDA may consider a drug that is promoted for off-label
use to be misbranded under section 502(f) of the FDCA.22 Under this
provision, a drug is misbranded if its labeling fails to bear "adequate
directions for use."23 For prescription drug labeling, the manufacturer
must provide adequate directions for licensed practitioners to use the
drug for all of the purposes for which the drug is "intended," which
the regulations define to include all uses for which the drug is "adver-
16 PETER BARTON HuTr ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 598-605, 674-812 (3d ed. 2007).
17 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2010); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.126, .601.2 (2009).
18 See HUTr ET AL., supra note 16, at 735-36, 754-71.
' 21 C.F.R. § 201.80 (2010).
20 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, GOOD REPRINT
PRACTICES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR
SCIENTIFIC REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED
DRUGS AND APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES 2-3 (2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf.
21 H.R. 2751, 111 th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (enacted) (amending 21 U.S.C. §
331).
22 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2010).
23 See id. § 352(f).
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tised or represented."2 4 At the same time, however, the only permitted
source of the directions to licensed practitioners for the intended uses
is the FDA-approved labeling in the NDA (or ANDA or BLA).2 5
This regulatory construct purports to limit all permissible promo-
tion to the approved indications because the only permitted source for
adequate directions is FDA's approved labeling. Therefore, it is not
possible to provide directions for a claim that a drug is safe or effec-
tive for an unapproved use. Making the claim for the unapproved in-
dication will establish an intended use without the required corres-
ponding directions, and in doing so will (in FDA's view) cause the
drug to be deemed misbranded under section 502(f)(1) of the FDCA.26
Another key aspect of FDA's regulation of drug product speech is
the requirement of fair balance and the proper presentation of risk
information. Under the FDCA, "labeling"-a term recognized to in-
clude a broad array of communications beyond the package of the
drug27 -may not be "false or misleading in any particular." 28 Further,
the regulations require advertisements for drugs to present a "fair bal-
ance" between information relating to side effects and contraindica-
tions and information relating to effectiveness of the drug, and they
must not fail to reveal material facts. 2 9
"Fair balance," as defined by the regulations, requires drug adver-
tisements to place information in a proper context. Specifically, the
advertisement must present a fair balance "between information relat-
ing to side effects and contraindications and information relating to
effectiveness in that the information relating to effectiveness is pre-
sented in greater scope, depth, or detail . . . ."30 In addition, the regula-
tions require that claims and risk information be given comparable
prominence and readability.31 One important exception to the fair
balance requirement, however, is reminder advertising. These types of
24 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (2010); see also id. § 201.100(d)(1).
21 Id. § 201.100(c)(2).
26 See John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299, 309 (2010) ("A manufacturer's intended use includes all uses
objectively intended by the drug manufacturer based upon statements made in labe-
ling, in advertisements, or in written or oral statements by company representatives,
and if the FDA-approved labeling does not cover each "intended use" then a drug is
also deemed to be misbranded."); see also John N. Joseph et al., Enforcement Related
to Off-Label Marketing and Use of Drugs and Devices: Where Have We Been and
Where Are We Going?, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE Scl. L. 73, 78-79 (2009).
27 HuTr ET AL., supra note 16, at 98-106.
28 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006).
29 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii) (2010).
30 Id.
*' Id. § 202.1(e)(3)(i); id. § 202.1(e)(7)(vii-viii).
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advertisements feature the name of a drug without referencing any
uses or benefits of the product. 32 Reminder advertisements may not
be used for products with boxed warnings, a type of warning that de-
scribes a risk FDA has deemed particularly serious.
2. Devices
In relation to drugs, medical devices are subject to a similar but
more complex regulatory scheme. Medical devices are categorized
into classes based on risk. These risk categorizations largely dictate
pre-market requirements, which include a pre-market approval (PMA)
application that is similar in depth to an NDA; a more-abbreviated
"510k clearance" based on substantial equivalence to a predicate de-
vice; and no pre-market notification or approval requirements for cer-
tain low-risk devices exempted by regulation.34
FDA regulates the labeling of all medical devices and the adver-
tising of certain devices that it classifies by regulation or approval
order as "restricted," which subjects the devices to additional re-
quirements." In many respects, the laws and regulations are similar to
those governing drug promotion. The same misbranding provisions
that apply to drug labeling under the FDCA apply to medical device
labeling. Thus, medical devices must not have promotional labeling
that is false or misleading in any particular3 6 or that lacks adequate
directions for use. 37 The rules exempt prescription devices (which
may or may not include restricted devices) from the adequate direc-
tions for use requirement in a manner largely similar to the exemption
for prescription drugs. In addition, FDA considers claims that go
beyond a device's cleared or approved indication to adulterate a de-
vice under section 501(f)(1)(B) of the FDCA, which requires premar-
ket approval for class III devices. Such claims would also misbrand
the device under section 502(o), 3 8 which considers a device to be mi-
sbranded if it is introduced into interstate commerce without being the
subject of notification under section 5 10(k).3 9
32 Id. § 202.1(e)(2)(i).
1 Id.; id. § 201.57(e).
34 HUTr ET AL., supra note 16, at 991-1025.
FDA Oversight of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Medical Devices:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, I 10th Cong. (2008) (state-
ment of Daniel Shultz, MD, Dir., Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health).
36 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006).
" Id. § 352(f.
31 Id. § 352(q).
3 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy A. Ulatowski, Dir., Off. of Compliance,
Ctr. For Devices & Radiological Health to Karen Roche, Vice President, Operations
and Technology, Spineology, Inc. (Aug. 15, 2007), available at
116 [Vol. 21:111
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Neither the FDCA nor FDA regulations set forth specific fair bal-
ance requirements for prescription or restricted devices, although the
FDCA prohibits device labeling and advertising that is false or mis-
leading.40 And recently, the agency indicated that its policies regard-
ing fair balance and presentation of risk information apply equally to
devices, even though these policies stem in part from the agency's
interpretation of the regulations governing drug labeling and advertis-
41ing.
3. Food and Supplements
Foods and dietary supplements, which are considered foods but
receive special treatment under the FDCA,42 are subject to various
affirmative labeling rules regarding ingredients, quantity, and nutri-
tional information.4 3 In addition, FDA has promulgated regulations
regarding the more contentious issues of nutrient content claims and
health claims. Nutrient content claims are claims that characterize the
amount of a nutrient in a food (e.g., "low fat"), while health claims are
statements that directly or indirectly characterize the relationship of
nutrients in food to a disease or health-related condition."
FDA permits health claims for conventional foods after the agen-
cy has promulgated a regulation specifying its language and the condi-
tions under which it may be used.45 Manufacturers may petition for a
health claim, and FDA must review and provide a ruling within 540
days.46 FDA will permit the claim if it determines, on the basis of all
available scientific evidence, that there is "significant scientific
agreement" supporting the claim.47
The agency also allows for "qualified" health claims, as a result of
First Amendment case law described below. These claims require
pre-market approval through a petition describing how the claim is
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WamingLetters/2006/ucm076472.ht
m.
40 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (q) (2006).
41 U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: PRESENTING RISK INFORMATION IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MEDICAL
DEVICE PROMOTION: DRAFT GUIDANCE 1-2 (proposed May 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guid
ances/ucml55480.pdf.
42 21 U.S.C. § 356a (2009).
43 Carver, supra note 3, at 153-55.
4 Id. at 159-61 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.14(a)(1), 101.13(b)).
45 Id. at 159 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(2)(A)(i)).
46 Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. §101.70(j)(4)(ii)).
47 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(i)(2009).
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supported by "credible evidence," among other requirements. 4 8 A
disclaimer is required depending on the level of scientific evidence
supporting the claim.49 FDA will permit health claims that are aimed
at risk reduction; the agency considers claims about disease mitigation
or treatment to be drug claims not authorized for use in foods.50
Similar to conventional foods, the agency permits dietary supple-
ment health claims after it has promulgated a regulation authorizing
such claims and providing their explicit language, or when the claims
are "qualified" according to FDA standards. 5 ' The rules regarding
claims for supplements are regulatory in origin, 52 unlike the statutory
basis for such claims for food,5 3 but FDA interprets them in a similar
manner. 54
FDA generally prohibits nutrient content claims unless they recite
the exact language provided in its regulations.5 5 Two forms are al-
lowed: "absolute," and "relative or comparative."5 6 The absolute cate-
gory describes the level of a nutrient in a product, whereas relative
claims compare the amount of the nutrient in the product with that
amount in a similar product. 5 Some nutrient content claims are prohi-
bited if the amount of another component (e.g., cholesterol) exceeds a
certain level, and some claims are subject to additional disclosure
requirements if the food contains certain nutrients (e.g., fat, sodium)
above a specified level.
4. Tobacco
The regulation of tobacco is the newest of FDA's regulatory tasks.
Although the agency attempted to assert jurisdiction over tobacco
products under its authority over medical devices in the 1990s, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that the FDCA did not provide the
48 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED
NUTRITION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: FDA's IMPLEMENTATION OF QUALIFIED
HEALTH CLAIMS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidancedocume
nts/foodlabelingnutrition/ucm053843.htm; Carver, supra note 3, at 160.
49 Carver, supra note 3, at 160.
50 Id.
5' Id. at 161-62.
52 See 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(5)(D) (2009) (directing the Secretary to promulgate
rules for health claims for dietary supplements).
Id. § 321(r) (setting forth the process for approval of health claims for
foods).
54 See Carver, supra note 3, at 159-62.
5 Id. at 160.
56 Id.
57 id
ss Id. at 161; 21 C.F.R. § 101.13(h)(1) (2005).
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agency with statutory authority for this function.59 In 2009, however,
Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Con-
trol Act (the Tobacco Control Act),60 which provided FDA with ex-
press statutory authority over tobacco products. 6 1
The Tobacco Control Act contains a number of restrictions on the
marketing of tobacco products. Under the Act, FDA is authorized to
restrict the sale, distribution, advertising, and promotion of tobacco
products, as well as access to tobacco products as appropriate to pro-
tect the public health (of both users and non users).62 The Tobacco
Control Act instructs FDA to reissue the 1996 final rule that the Su-
preme Court struck down, with several specified revisions. 6 3 Some
specific speech limitations in the Act include:
* Prohibitions on billboard and outdoor advertising within
1,000 feet of schools and public playgrounds (subject to mod-
ification by FDA in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly). 4
* Prohibitions on tobacco manufacturers from distributing
items such as caps, t-shirts, and sporting goods that bear the
name or logo of a tobacco brand.65
* Prohibitions on the sponsorship of sporting events or
teams using the brand name of a tobacco product.6 6
* Restrictions limiting tobacco advertising to black text on
white background only, with the exception of advertising in
adult-only facilities and predominately adult periodicals. 67
59 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000).
60 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. & 21 U.S.C.).
61 21 U.S.C. § 387a(a) (2006).
62 Id. § 387f(d)(1).
63 Id. § 387a-1.
6 Id. § 387a- I (a)(2)(E). FDA has stated that it does not intend to enforce this
restriction until it further considers how to modify this restriction. Request for Com-
ment on Implementation of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act,
75 Fed. Reg. 13,241, 13,241-43 (Mar. 10, 2010).
6s 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1(a)(2) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(a)-(b) (2010) (im-
plementing the 1996 proposed rule).
66 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1(a)( 2) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.34(c) (2010) (imple-
menting the 1996 proposed rule).
67 21 U.S.C. § 387a-l(a)(2) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010) (implement-
ing the 1996 proposed rule).
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* Requirements for new, explicit warnings and colored
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smok-
ing, and rotating statements in bold type, occupying at least
the top 50 percent of both panels for cigarettes and 30 percent
of both panels for smokeless tobacco products.6 8
* Prohibitions on labeling and advertising on existing prod-
ucts using "light," "mild," "low," or similar descriptors after
June 22, 2010 (unless a modified risk claim is approved by
FDA).
FDA has already implemented a number of these restrictions. As
instructed, the agency reissued its 1996 rule,7 0 Regulations Restricting
the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to
Protect Children and Adolescents. 7 1 In addition, the agency issued an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking asking for comment on poten-
tial outdoor advertising restrictions.7 2 And recently, the agency issued
proposed rules that would require the use of a series of graphic images
depicting, among other things, a cancer patient, a corpse, damaged
lungs, and a sickened neonate.73
B. First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech
1. The General Framework
"Commercial speech," as defined by the Supreme Court, is speech
that either proposes a commercial transaction or meets a three-part test
that analyzes whether the speech is otherwise commercial because it
constitutes an advertisement, refers to a specific product, or is made
68 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31 §
201, 123 Stat. 1842, 1842-48 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 4402
(2010)).
69 21 U.S.C. § 387k.
70 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug.
28, 1996).
7 Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,225 (Mar.
19, 2010) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140).
72 Request for Comment on Implementation of the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act, supra note 64.
73 See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 75
Fed. Reg. 69,524, 69,524-65 (Nov. 12, 2010).
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with an economic motivation.7 4 Speech fulfilling all three of these
factors will almost surely be considered commercial, but it is unsettled
whether speech meeting only one or two of these factors will be con-
sidered commercial in nature. 5
The Supreme Court has held that commercial speech enjoys First
Amendment protection, and the government may restrict such speech
only under certain conditions. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Service Commission ofNew York, 6 it set forth the following
four-part test to evaluate the validity of a commercial speech restric-
tion, still used today:
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amend-
ment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mis-
leading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental in-
terest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 77
A government agency seeking to impose the restriction bears the bur-
den of justifying it under this four-part test.78
Under the first prong, the government may ban commercial
speech concerning an activity that itself is illegal (e.g., prostitution).7 9
It also may ban "misleading" speech, which the Supreme Court has
stated comes in two categories: potentially misleading speech and
inherently misleading speech.8 0 While inherently misleading speech
may be banned outright, potentially misleading speech may be
banned only when the government shows that the speech is in fact
misleading. This burden generally requires the government to make a
74 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67
(1983).
7 Carver, supra note 3, at 170 (citing Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67 n.13, 68 n.14).
1 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
n Id. at 566.
71 See id. at 570.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388-89
(1973).




substantial evidentiary showing,8 2 and it must also demonstrate that
disclaimers would not cure the problem.83
The second prong-a requirement that the government assert a
substantial interest-typically requires a showing that speech in ques-
tion poses a real (and not hypothetical) harm. The government typical-
ly satisfies this prong, as the Supreme Court has found a variety of
harms to justify a substantial government interest.84
The third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test often pose
a greater challenge for the government. To satisfy the third prong, the
government must produce evidence showing that the regulation direct-
ly and consistently advances its goals.85 The speech restriction must
"alleviate [the cited harm] to material degree," and the connection
cannot consist of "mere speculation or conjecture."86 Further, the
speech restriction must be consistent and rational.87 The Supreme
Court has struck down speech restrictions where "overall irrationality"
prevents them from achieving the government's supporting interest.88
To satisfy the fourth prong, the government must demonstrate that
its restriction is narrowly tailored-that is, the same result could not
be achieved by avoiding a speech restriction or by restricting less
speech.89 Put differently, "regulating speech must be a last-not
first-resort."90 The government may also fail this prong if it singles
out commercial speech for a selective ban while permitting other
types of speech. 91
82 Carver, supra note 3, at 172-73 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
12-17 (1979)).
83 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002); Ibanez v.
Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994).
8 Carver, supra note 3, at 173.
85 Id. at 174.
86 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993).
87 Carver, supra note 3, at 174.
8 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995) (finding law
banning alcohol percentage in advertisements was irrational because it permitted
alcohol content on labels); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 527 U.S. 173, 190 (1990) (finding that a ban on casino advertising contained
so many exceptions and inconsistencies that it could not advance its stated purpose).
89 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) ("[I]f the
Government could achieve its interest in a manner that does not restrict speech, or
that restricts less speech, the Government must do so." (emphasis added)).
9 Idat 373.
91 Carver, supra note 3, at 176 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993)).
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2. Commercial Speech in the Food and Drug Context
a. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center
These concepts have been applied a number of times in the food
and drug context. In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,92
the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) 9 3 that exempted com-
pounding pharmacies from the new drug, adulteration, and misbrand-
ing provisions of the FDCA, provided the pharmacies did not adver-
tise or promote their products. 9 4 The parties did not dispute that the
speech was commercial and non-misleading. 9 5 Further, the court
found that prong two of the test was satisfied because the government
had a substantial interest in preserving the NDA approval process. 9 6
On the third prong, the Court agreed-with some hesitation-that a
speech ban could serve as a means to further useful small-scale phar-
macy compounding while discouraging large-scale manufacturing.9 7
The Court found, however, that the fourth prong could not be satis-
fied. Importantly, the government failed to pursue other non-speech
restrictions, such as banning equipment for large-scale manufacturing,
forbidding wholesale of compounded drugs, limiting compounded
drug sales, and relying on existing restrictions on compounding sales
and revenues. 98
b. Cases Considering Off-Label Speech
In Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman99 and Washington
Legal Foundation v. Henney,100 the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered the constitutional validity of FDA's guidance on
industry-supported scientific and education activities (which restricted
manufacturers' ability to discuss off-label uses with the medical
92 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
9 Food and Drug Administration Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111
Stat. 2297 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered in sections of21 U.S.C.).
94 Thompson, 533 U.S. at 360.
" Id. at 368.
96 Id. at 369.
9 Id. at 371 ("Assuming it is true that drugs cannot be marketed on a large
scale without advertising, the FDAMA's prohibition on advertising compounded
drugs might indeed 'directly advanc[e]' the Government's interests." (citing Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
98 Id. at 373 ("The Government has not offered any reason why these possi-
bilities, alone or in combination, would be insufficient to prevent compounding from
occurring on such a scale as to undermine the new drug approval process.").
99 13 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
10 56 F.Supp.2d 81, 82 (D.D.C. 1999).
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community) and FDAMA's off-label provision. In the first decision,
the court found that the agency's policy, as articulated in the guidance
document, violated the First Amendment. At the outset, the court re-
jected the agency's argument that off-label speech was actually con-
duct, and that the speech itself was illegal or inherently misleading. 1oi
The speech was not inherently misleading because restrictions short of
a total ban could remedy the misleading aspects. 102
The court found that the second and third prongs were satisfied
because the ban furthered a substantial interest in protecting the NDA
approval scheme. 103 The court rejected, however, the agency's argu-
ment that the government had a substantial interest in ensuring that
physicians received accurate information, reasoning that doctors-a
sophisticated audience-were capable of evaluating promotional ma-
terials. 104 The policy failed the fourth prong because disclaimers con-
stituted a less-restrictive alternative to a total ban.i05 In the Friedman
case, the district court later invalidated FDAMA's section 401-
which permitted dissemination of information about unapproved uses
provided that the manufacturer file a supplemental NDA and meet
other requirements106 -on very similar reasoning. 10 7 The district
court's decisions in these cases were later vacated by the D.C. Circuit
when FDA mooted the controversy by claiming, for the first time on
appeal, that its position was simply a "safe harbor" outside of which
FDA would not necessarily take enforcement action. 08 The D.C. Cir-
cuit observed, however, that it did not reach the merits of the contro-
versy, and it was "not criticiz[ing] the reasoning or conclusions of the
district court."'
09
More recently, in United States v. Caputo, the Northern District of
Illinois considered the validity of FDA's off-label speech ban in a
criminal case brought against executives of a medical device company
who had promoted a modified version of a previously cleared de-
vice. 10 The district court found that the defendant's off-label speech
(which it assumed was not misleading, for purposes of the ruling) was
01 Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. at 59.
102 Id. at 68-69.
103 Id. at 69-71.
0 Id.
0o5 Id. at 73-74.
1o6 21 U.S.C. § 360aaa(b) (2006) (detailing the requirements for disseminat-
ing drug information).
107 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 56 F.Supp.2d 81, 87 (D.D.C. 1999) (rea-
soning that the requirement acted as a sort of "constitutional blackmail.").
0o Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F3d. 331, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
'0 Id. at 337 n.7.
10 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914-15 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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not constitutionally protected because the Government had satisfied
the four prongs of the Central Hudson test."' Specifically, the court
reasoned that, unlike the Washington Legal Foundation cases, the
defendants' argument struck "at the very heart of' FDA's regulatory
scheme, and it was "unable to identify a less burdensome alternative
that would advance the government's substantial interest."I12
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed but did not reach the con-
stitutional question.I" Rather, because the jury found that subject
devices could not be marketed legally, there were no lawful uses to
promote.114 In dicta, however, Judge Easterbrook discussed the consti-
tutionality of an off-label speech ban:
And if a given use is lawful, and thus can be written about
freely in newspapers or blogs, and discussed among hospitals
that already have purchased a Plazlyte, doesn't it make a good
deal of sense to allow speech by the device's manufacturer,
which after all will have the best information? Why privilege
speech by the uninformed? The manufacturer has an incentive
to slant the speech in its favor and may withhold bad news,
but many listeners (especially professionals such as physi-
cians) understand this and can discount appropriately. That, at
any rate, is the anti-paternalist view of Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council and the cases that followed in its wake. "'
At the same time, however, he noted that dismantling the off-label
construct could motivate FDA to withhold approvals of drugs and
devices with additional, questionable uses, injuring consumers who
use them for both on and off-label uses.' 6 Easterbrook concluded,
that "[d]oubtless the first amendment differs from Bentham's felicific
calculus"-in other words, one need not demonstrate a net societal
positive to invoke its protections-"but a court should hesitate before
extending an a [sic] historical reading of the Constitution in a way that
injures the very audience that is supposed to benefit from free
speech."" 7
.. Id. at 921-22.
112 Id. at 922.
11 United States v. Caputo, 517 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2008).
114 id
"t Id. at939.
6 See id. at 940. It is questionable whether FDA could really do this as a
practical matter. In the device context, for example, the agency must look only to the
proposed labeling when determining the intended use of a device seeking 510(k)
clearance. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(E) (2006).
"' Caputo, 517 F.3d at 940.
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c. Cases Considering Health Claims for Foods and Supplements
A series of cases have also considered the validity of FDA's ap-
proach to approving and rejecting health claims for dietary supple-
ments. In Pearson v. Shalala, the D.C. Circuit found the FDA had
acted unconstitutionally when it rejected proposed health claims by
dietary supplement makers. The manufacturers had asserted a connec-
tion between antioxidants, fiber, and omega 3 acids and the risk of
several diseases, and claimed that folic acid in supplement form pro-
vided greater protection against neural tube defects than lower
amounts in conventional foods. "8 Applying prong one of the Central
Hudson test, the court rejected as paternalistic the agency's claim that
the proposed claims were inherently misleading, reasoning that con-
sumers are capable of exercising some judgment at the point of
sale.' 19 The court characterized FDA's argument as "almost frivol-
ous," because it essentially viewed consumers as being "asked to buy
something while hypnotized."1
2 0
The government also argued that the claims were potentially mis-
leading and, thus, it did not need to consider a disclaimer policy for
them. 121 The court reasoned that the government's argument required
it to consider the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson analy-
siS.12 2 The court found that the government had satisfied the second
prong because it had substantial interests in protecting public health
and guarding against deceptive marketing practices. However, it
found that the government fulfilled the third prong with respect to the
latter of these interests only.12 3 On the first point, the government con-
tended that "common sense" supported its position but did not come
forward with any evidence, leading to its rejection. 124 On the second
point, the court reasoned that some health claims would invariably
mislead the public, and a high standard requiring FDA approval
would reduce the amount of fraud. 125
Despite satisfying the first three prongs of the Central Hudson
test, the government's insistence that it need not permit disclaimers
ultimately doomed its case. The fourth prong cannot be satisfied
"' 164 F.3d 650, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
"' Id. at 655.
120 id
121 Id.
122 Id. at 656 ("Under Central Hudson, we are obliged to evaluate a govern-
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"when the government chooses a policy of suppression over disclo-
sure-at least where there is no showing that disclosure would not
suffice to cure misleadingness .*. .. "26 The court remanded the claim
for FDA to consider proper disclaimers. 127
FDA then published a notice requesting submission of scientific
data concerning the four health claims at issue in that case and issued
a guidance setting forth the standard that the agency planned to use to
evaluate qualified health claims.' 2 8 After reviewing the scientific in-
formation submitted in support of the folic acid claim, the agency
rejected the proposed claim, finding that it would be inherently mis-
leading. 129
The district court rejected FDA's position, finding that the agency
"failed to comply with the constitutional guidelines outlined in [the
D.C. Circuit's opinion]."l 30 Although the court deferred to the agen-
cy's "method of dissecting" and reading the folic acid claim under the
Administrative Procedure Act, it disagreed with FDA's weighing of
the scientific data and found as a matter of law that the folic acid
claim was not inherently misleading.131 The court concluded that
"[t]he mere absence of significant affirmative evidence in support of a
particular claim . .. does not translate into negative evidence 'against'
it."l 32 Moreover, the court held that the "question which must be ans-
wered under [the D.C. Circuit's opinion] is whether there is any 'cred-
ible evidence' in support of the claim.' 3 3 If such evidence exists, the
claim may not be prohibited unless that evidence is "outweighed by
evidence against the claim" or is "qualitatively weaker" than evidence
against the claim.134
In two other cases, however, the agency survived First Amend-
ment challenges. In Nutritional Health Alliance v. Shalala, the Second
Circuit determined that the 540-day deadline for an agency determina-
tion on a health claim was reasonable under Central Hudson.'35 in
Whitaker v. Thompson, the D.C. Circuit considered whether classify-
126 Id. at 657-58.
127 Id. at 661.
128 Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110-11 (2001).
129 Id. at 111.
130 Id at 112.
13' Id. at 114 n.24.
132 Id. at 115.
' Id. at 118.
134 Id. at 114-15. The agency was again reversed in Whitaker v. Thompson,
when it refused to permit the claims based on the antioxidant-cancer relationship at
issue in the D.C. Circuit's Pearson opinion. 248 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2002).
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Western States, the court reasoned that FDA
must regulate speech in the "least restrictive means of achieving its goals." Id at 9.
13 144 F.3d 220, 228 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ing products bearing unapproved health claims as drugs violated the
First Amendment. The court found that the statute simply used manu-
facturer speech as evidence of intent to market a drug, and Supreme
Court case law permitted "the evidentiary use of speech to establish
the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent."' 36 Thus, the
court essentially found that Central Hudson permitted FDA to look to
a manufacturer's intent (as illustrated by its speech) to classify prod-
ucts under the FDCA.137
II. RECENT ENFORCEMENT
FDA's enforcement actions have clashed with the First Amend-
ment over the past several decades. But the frequency and signific-
ance of these conflicts have increased in the wake of a recent and
more aggressive enforcement posture with respect to speech-related
conduct.
A. Drugs & Devices
FDA has recently participated in two cases-Allergan v. United
States and United States v. Coronia-that involve challenges to par-
ticularly aggressive positions regarding off-label promotion, and
which may have implications for regulatory schemes governing drugs
and devices. Outside the courts, FDA has taken other aggressive en-
forcement positions, including a crack-down on the use of sponsored
search links.
1. Allergan v. United States
Allergan, a California-based manufacturer of drugs and devices,
sued FDA in October of 2009 for declaratory and injunctive relief
regarding its ability to communicate with physicians about off-label
uses of its drug, Botox. 13 8 Beyond its cosmetic uses, Botox can be
used for therapeutic indications, several of which are off-label and
used for diseases with small populations 3 9-- in other words, uses for
which there may be little or no financial incentive to seek approval. In
April of 2009, FDA mandated that Allergan implement safety label
changes to Botox and complete a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
136 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508
U.S. 476, 489 (1993)).
13 id.
138 Complaint 1, 10, Allergan v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879, (D.D.C.
filed Oct. 1, 2009) [hereinafter Allergan Complaint].
139 Id. 11 55-63.
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Strategy (REMS) to include a Medication Guide to patients. 14 0 In July
of 2009, FDA approved Allergan's REMS, a black-box warning for
Botox, a "Dear Health Care Provider" letter, and a medication guide,
all of which used the agency's proposed content. The black-box warn-
ing included information about adverse events in off-label uses, par-
ticularly instances of the spread of toxins from the injection site when
used to treat children with cerebral palsy.14 1 In its lawsuit, Allergan
contended that it will continue to provide general warnings through
the REMS program, but it believed that FDA regulations concerning
dissemination of off-label communications do not permit it to provide
physicians with enough specific and detailed information such as do-
sages, proper injection technique, and patient selection for the off-
label uses. 142
Allergan's suit challenged several FDA regulations, both facially
and applied to Allergan's desire to distribute information about Bo-
tox's off-label uses. Specifically, Allergan's complaint contended that
the agency's intended use regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.100 and
201.128, in combination with the requirement that a manufacturer
provide adequate directions for use (which must include directions for
any intended use), form a prior restraint that limits communications to
on-label information.143
The Allergan suit appeared to be a near-perfect opportunity to test
the constitutionality of FDA's off-label speech restrictions as applied
to truthful and non-misleading speech. It is difficult to conceive how
FDA could justify the restriction of Allergan's proposed communica-
tions, which are not really promotional-at least in the normal sense
of the word-and are designed to minimize adverse events for a med-
ically accepted use of the product. 1" The primary issue in this case
would likely have been Central Hudson step four, specifically wheth-
er the prohibition is narrowly tailored to further the government's
interests in protecting the NDA process and removing misleading
speech from the marketplace. On the first point, as Allergan noted in
'4 Id. 1171-72.
141 Id. IT 73-74.
142 Id. TT 76-89.
143 Id. TT 89-95. In count V, Allergan argued that FDA's ban of speech about
a use for which Allergan was seeking a supplemental approval was unconstitutional.
This part of Allergan's suit is now moot, however, as FDA approved Allergan's sup-
plemental BLA for this use. Def.'s Reply in Support of Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ.
J. and Res. to Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 19, Allergan v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-
01879 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 29, 2010).
14 The uses about which Allergan wishes to speak are recognized in compen-
dia and receive reimbursement from government insurance programs. Allergan Com-
plaint, at if 61-63.
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its summary judgment papers, numerous other alternatives exist, in-
cluding the sensible enforcement of regulations and laws already on
the books and the adoption of incentives to encourage the filing of
NDAs (e.g., heavier taxes for revenues from off-label uses).1 45 And,
of course, the agency would need to demonstrate that requiring manu-
facturers to use a disclaimer that the use about which they speak is
off-label would be insufficient to encourage them from seeking NDA
approval in cases where the incentive would otherwise exist.146 Also
damaging to FDA's case is that the intended use regulations act as a
speaker-specific speech restriction, allowing anyone other than manu-
facturers, distributors, and packers to speak about off-label uses.147
In September of 2010, however, Allergan dropped the suit as part
of a settlement of criminal and civil claims regarding its promotion of
Botox.148 In a press release regarding the settlement, the Justice De-
partment alleged that Allergan was marketing Botox for the treatment
of headache, pain, spasticity, and juvenile cerebral palsy, which were
off-label uses during the timeframe alleged.14 9
Had the case not settled, there is a good possibility that the court
would have ruled for Allergan on the most narrow issue presented:
whether manufacturers have a right to disseminate instructions for
safe off-label use for the purpose of accompanying the warnings FDA
has already required. The case also offered an opportunity to provide
some guidance on the larger issue of whether and under what condi-
tions companies can communicate, in ways that would typically be
considered promotion, about unapproved indications. This larger issue
is important: the Department of Justice has lead a lucrative campaign
against drug manufacturers, garnering settlements in the billions.'5 0
145 Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 22-25, Allergan, Inc.
v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879-JDB (D.D.C. filed Jan. 15, 2010).
146 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002); Wash. Legal
Found. v. Friedman, 13 F.Supp.2d 51, 73-74 (D.D.C. 1998).
147 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
194 (1999) ("[D]ecisions that select among speakers conveying virtually identical
messages are in serious tension with the principles undergirding the First Amend-
ment.").
148 Nisha P. Shaw, Allergan Settles with DOJ Related to the Sales and Mar-
keting of BOTOX, FDALAwBLOG (Sept. 1, 2010, 12:13 PM), available at
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fdalaw blog hymanphelps/2010/09/allergan-settles-
with-doj-related-to-the-sales-and-marketing-of-botox.htm.
149 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay
$600 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox@ (Sept. 1,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 10/September/1 0-civ-988.html.
150 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-835, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS:
FDA's OVERSIGHT OF THE PROMOTION OF DRUGS FOR OFF-LABEL USES 2-3, 26-27
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-vin/getrpt?/GAO-08-835; Press Release,
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The conduct in these cases varies considerably, but their conceptual
underpinnings are generally the same: that off-label promotion is ca-
tegorically unlawful and may be restricted by the government, regard-
less of scientific validity."' The industry, the public, and physicians
sorely need a declaration on the extent of First Amendment protection
for promotional and non-promotional communications regarding off-
label use, as the current regime excessively chills both activities.
2. United States v. Caronia
United States v. Caronia is a criminal appeal pending in the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The case is a rare
government prosecution of a pharmaceutical sales representative for
off-label promotion. Even more exceptional, however, are the facts of
the case.
Alfred Caronia was employed by Orphan Medical (since acquired
by Jazz Pharmaceuticals) to sell Xyrem, a drug approved at the time
for cataplexy in narcolepsy patients.152 Xyrem also had various off-
label uses, one of which was for excessive daytime sleepiness.' At
some point, Caronia attended a meeting with Dr. Steven Chamo, a
government informant. Dr. Charno asked a number of questions about
off-label uses of Xyrem, to which Caronia provided answers. 15 To-
wards the end of the meeting, Caronia arranged for a follow-up meet-
ing with Dr. Charno and Dr. Peter Gleason, a doctor who spoke on
behalf of Orphan Medical on uses of Xyrem.155 During the follow-up
meeting, Gleason (who pled guilty to misbranding)156 spoke to Char-
Dep't of Justice, Pharmaceutical Company Eli Lilly to Pay Record $1.415 Billion For
Off-Label Drug Marketing, (Jan. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2009/jan/lillyrelease.pdf; Carrie Johnson,
In Settlement, A Warning to Drugmakers: Pfizer to Pay Record Penalty in Improper-
Marketing Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/02/AR2009090 201449.html.
'5 Complaint 43, Allergan, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:09-cv-01879-JDB
(D.D.C. filed Jan. 15, 2010) ("Any indication not on the label is off-label, and selling
an approved drug intended that it be used for an off-label use is a violation of the
law.") (quoting Michael Loucks, Justice Dep't Press Conference, Health Care Fraud
Settlement with Pfizer (Sept. 2, 2009)).
152 Br. and App. of Def.-Appellant at 2, United States v. Caronia, No. 09-5006
(2d Cir. filed Dec. 3, 2009).
Id. at 40.
1 Id. at A-9 to A-31.
Id. at A-28 to A-31.
156 Minute Entry for Plea Proceedings, United States v. Gleason, No. 1:06-cr-
00229 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2008).
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no about off-label uses of Xyrem to treat excessive sleepiness.15 7 Ca-
ronia did not discuss these uses, but he did discuss reimbursement
issues.' 8 Shortly thereafter, FDA approved Xyrem for excessive day-
time sleepiness.1 5 9 The jury found these facts sufficient to convict
Caronia of conspiracy to misbrand.
Before the trial, the district court rejected Caronia's First
Amendment argument, finding that FDA's restriction of off-label
speech was sufficiently narrowly tailored under Central Hudson step
four.1 60 The opinion follows the reasoning of United States v. Caputo,
summarized above, in which a district court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the off-label construct, reasoning that it would topple
FDA's drug approval regulatory scheme.161
The case is legally significant for several reasons. Perhaps most
importantly, it presents a challenge to FDA's practice of avoiding
constitutional challenges by recharacterizing its speech ban as a ban
on conduct. In other words, FDA attempts to circumvent the constitu-
tional implications of banning speech by arguing that it is simply us-
ing off-label speech as evidence to establish intended use.' 62 In this
case, the only evidence of Caronia's crime was his and Gleason's off-
label speech, meaning that he was convicted solely based on speech.
And more significantly, that speech concerned a use of the product
that FDA approved just days after the alleged criminal conduct. To
prevail on the constitutional issue, the government must demonstrate
that criminal punishment is necessary to advance the interests it has
presented.
The district court, however, tersely concluded that Washington
Legal Foundation v. Friedman and Western States were distinguisha-
ble, because Caronia's challenge struck at the "heart" of the regulato-
ry scheme, and the court was otherwise "unable to identify non-
speech restrictions that would likely constrain in any effective way
manufacturers from circumventing that approval process." 63 In a
157 Br. and App. of Def.-Appellant, supra note 152, at A-33 to A-48.
158 Id. at A-48 to A-54.
s5 Id. at 40.
160 United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401-02 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
161 Id. at 401 ("This Court, however, finds more compelling the conclusion
reached by the district court in Caputo that a First Amendment challenge by a drug or
de-vice-maker or its agents in such circumstances 'strikes at the heart of the FDA's
ability to proscribe manufacturer promotion of off-label use."' (quoting United States
v. Caputo, 288 F. Supp. 2d 912, 922 (N.D. Ill. 2002))).
162 Richard Samp, FDA Censorship Shouldn't Survive Scrutiny in "Off-
Label" Speech Case, LEGAL PULSE (May 6, 2010),
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2010/05/06/fda-censorship-shouldnt-survive-court-scrutiny-
in-off-label-speech-case/.
163 Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
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footnote, the court noted that several non-regulatory options have
been suggested by commentators, but "[n]o one, including Caronia,
has pointed to any regulatory proposal FDA could adopt to plug the
loophole in the new approval process . . . ."' That statement is troub-
ling in two respects: (1) it is unclear why other options would need to
be "regulatory" in nature; and (2) more importantly, it was the gov-
ernment's burden to demonstrate the need for the speech ban, not the
defendant's burden to show that other options would work equally
well. 165 Given that the government carries the burden to justify its
speech ban, 166 the presumption in step four should be that the speech
ban is too restrictive, unless the government discharges its burden to
show that it is an appropriate fit.
Like Allergan's lawsuit, however, the case could be resolved on
very narrow grounds. Because Xyrem was approved for daytime slee-
piness immediately after the alleged off-label speech relating to that
use, the Second Circuit can hold that the First Amendment protects
the exact speech at issue-that is, speech relating to an off-label use
under consideration and subsequently approved by FDA.167
3. The End of the "One-Click Rule"
Pharmaceutical companies had previously taken the approach that
sponsored links-a short advertisement appearing above search en-
gine results-could feature the drug's brand name and a short descrip-
tion without featuring the established name, risk information, and
FDA-approved indication, provided such information could be ac-
cessed by clicking on the link.168 On April 2, 2009, however, FDA
sent fourteen untitled letters alleging that these links made representa-
164 Id. at 402 n.12.
165 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
570 (1980).
166 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995) (describing the
government's burden under the Central Hudson test).
167 The government is also litigating a case against a former drug executive,
Scott Harkonen of InterMune, based on a press release he authored describing a phase
III study for an unapproved use of a drug. The district court in that case refused to
grant a motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment grounds, finding that
the government's allegation that the release was false removed it from First Amend-
ment protection. United States v. Harkonen, No. 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712,
at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2009).
168 Mark Senak, 14 Warning Letters in a Day! What's That About?, EYE ON




tions about the efficacy of a product without providing sufficient risk
information.169
The industry interpreted the FDA's regulations to permit the prac-
tice of sponsored links. This interpretation was reasonable-indeed
much more so than a contrary reading. After all, a link is just that-a
link to more information. Given FDA's prior treatment of print adver-
tising, which had generally permitted a summary of risk information
to appear on a different page of an advertising spread, a link would
seem appropriate because clicking it is analogous to turning a page. 170
As opposed to a banner advertisement, which is more often meant to
stand alone as an advertising piece, the sponsored link is one part of
an advertising piece that is fully integrated only after one follows the
link.
The constitutionality of the agency's position in these letters is
questionable. To begin, links with a short summary of truthful effica-
cy information do not mislead by their failure to include safety infor-
mation on the same screen. The sponsored link does not give the im-
pression that it contains all relevant information about the product,
especially in cases where the teaser instructs readers to "learn more
facts" by following the link. 17' Rather it gives the opposite impres-
sion: the user must click the link to learn about the product. Thus, the
sponsored link does not falsely imply that the advertised product is
without a safety risk.
Assuming the agency could satisfy the first three prongs of the
Central Hudson test, it would have to show that its policy is narrowly
tailored to further the asserted rationale for the rule-ensuring con-
sumers have truthful and non-misleading information about drug. But
it is unclear how such a policy could be considered narrowly tailored.
Because of space constraints in sponsored search advertising, FDA's
insistence that the industry "cease the dissemination of violative" ma-
terialsl 72 amounts to an outright ban on even mentioning the drug's
use in these advertisements. Current practice appears to be a hyperlink
169 Id.
170 Gerald F. Masoudi & Melissa Wittingham, Colliding, Again, with the First
Amendment, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 2010, at 12, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202446159724.
171 Contra Letter from Sangeeta Vaswani, Acting Group Leader, Div. of
Mktg., Adver., Comm'ns, to Christopher Graham, Assoc. Vice President, U.S. Regu-
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with the drug's brand name featured above a sentence stating the site
is "official," contains "answers" about the drug, or a similar variant.
FDA's policy has also discouraged industry members from using
Twitter or other space-constrained media platforms, especially for
black-box drugs that are not permitted to be the subject of reminder
advertisements and labeling.'73 Interestingly, FDA's own use of
space-constrained social media would violate this policy, if FDA were
subject to the speech restriction. For example, on November 5, 2010,
FDA tweeted: "FDA clears Cymbalta to treat chronic musculoskeletal
pain." 74 This, of course, belies an argument that space-constrained
messages about drugs are inherently misleading or dangerous.
Certainly, less restrictive alternatives could achieve the same goal
of permitting consumers to obtain truthful and non-misleading infor-
mation about products. But the agency never considered these possi-
bilities, choosing to send out a blitz of letters rather than open a dialo-
gue with the industry. Perhaps realizing its mistake, FDA called for
comments several months later regarding the use of the Internet and
social media to promote regulated products.' 75 The comments filed in
response illustrate the many alternatives the agency should have con-
sidered. For instance, PhRMA suggested that the agency permit an
abbreviated discussion of efficacy and risk accompanied with a "uni-
versal symbol" that marks a direct link to FDA-regulated informa-
tion.' 7 6 Consumers would know to follow this link to obtain safety
and other relevant information about a product.
17 FDA's Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications
sent an untitled letter in July of 2010 regarding Tasinga, a Novartis drug. Letter from
Karen R. Rulli, Acting Group Leader, Div. of Drug Mktg., Adver., and Comm'ns, to





1325.pdf. The letter cited the manufacturer's use of the "Facebook Share" widget,
which allows users to share a link to the website on their "Facebook Wall." FDA's
objection to the practice was that the link appearing on a user's wall featured a short
description of the shared site that lacked safety information. See id.
174 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA DrugInformation, TwITTER (Nov. 5,
2010, 8:17 AM), http://twitter.com/fda drug info (last visited November 9, 2010).
Similar to its policies regarding off-label promotion, FDA's position in this context
again serves as a speaker-specific restriction.
17 Public Hearing: Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical Products Using the
Internet and Social Media Tools, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,083 (Sept. 21, 2009).
176 Jeffrey K. Francer, Asst. General Counsel, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of
Am., Statement at FDA Public Meeting on Promotion of FDA-Regulated Medical




Even beyond constitutional issues, the crackdown is unwise in
terms of its effect. By dissuading manufacturers from sponsoring links
to legitimate and regulated content regarding brand-name drugs, FDA
widens the gap for the illegitimate (off-shore) internet "pharmacies"
that sell drugs (sometimes counterfeit) to United States consumers
without prescriptions, as well as "natural" remedies that FDA has
never evaluated. 77
B. Foods and Supplements
FDA has continued its policy of speech suppression in the food
and supplement industries through its exceedingly narrow construc-
tion of the standard for permitting qualified health claims and a blitz
of warning letters in March of 2010 addressing nutrient content
claims, health claims, and various other labeling matters.
1. Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius
Similar to the Pearson cases, various plaintiffs have sued FDA
over its denial of qualified health claim petitions for dietary supple-
ments containing selenium.1 78 The plaintiffs had sought approval for
ten qualified health claims regarding selenium's effects on cancer, and
provided over 150 scientific articles supporting the claims.17 9 In re-
sponse, the agency permitted qualified versions of three claims and
rejected seven other claims outright. 80 The plaintiffs filed suit, ar-
guing that the denial of four of the claims was unlawful and the dis-
claimer put on a fifth claim was unduly restrictive.181 The court found
for the plaintiffs, reasoning that FDA's disclaimer of the approved
claim essentially "replaced" the plaintiffs' claim and, further, that
FDA erred by disqualifying various studies the plaintiffs had offered
in support of their rejected claims.182
The case is illustrative in several respects. First, it emphasizes the
need for FDA to consider requiring a disclaimer in lieu of an outright
ban on the proposed speech. In the underlying administrative action,
177 Mark Senak, FDA Issues Warning Letter on Cheerios-Priorities Askew,
EYE ON FDA (May 13, 2009), http://www.eyeonfda.com/eye on fda/2009/05/fda-
issues-warning-letter-on-cheerios-priorities-askew.html ("That means now, if you
search on a term like "diabetes treatments" as I did this morning, and you may see an
ad that suggests that you can cure your diabetes naturally without drugs.").
17 Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sebelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 50
(D.D.C. 2010).
'9 Id. at 57.
1so Id. at 58.
182 Id at 71-72.
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FDA ruled that the plaintiffs' proposed claims stating selenium re-
duced the risk of "certain cancers" and had "anticarcinogenic effects"
were inherently misleading because only a few types of cancer were
implicated.1 8 The court soundly rejected this rationale, finding that
"the explanation FDA offers to demonstrate that plaintiffs' claims are
misleading-that the claims leave out pertinent information-is not
support for banning the claims entirely, but rather favors the approach
of remedying any potential misleadingness by the disclosure of addi-
tional information."l 84
Secondly, the case illustrates FDA's recalcitrance in complying
with First Amendment case law regarding qualified health claims. The
court had previously instructed FDA to consider approving a "short,
succinct, and accurate disclaimer" to accompany a proposed health
claim.' 8 5 Based on its concern about the use of use of the word "con-
vincing," and supposedly applying this standard, FDA transformed
the proposed:
Selenium may reduce the risk of prostate cancer. Scientific
evidence supporting this claim is convincing but not yet con-
clusive.
into:
Two weak studies suggest that selenium intake may reduce
the risk of prostate cancer. However, four stronger studies and
three weak studies showed no reduction in risk. Based on
these studies, FDA concludes that it is highly unlikely that se-
lenium supplements reduce the risk of prostate cancer.186
The court found that this qualification "eviscerated" the plaintiffs
claim without explaining why a less restrictive approach would not be
effective. For instance, FDA could have simply used language that
characterized the strength of the studies the plaintiffs cited (since that
was FDA's asserted problem with the language).187 Further, the court
rejected the disclaimer as inaccurate, finding that FDA had miscon-
strued study results.' 8 8
183 Id. at 58.
184 Id. at 63.
185 Id. at 71 (quoting Pearson v. Shalala, 130 F. Supp. 2d 105, 120 (D.D.C.
2001)).
186 Id. at 57 n.16, 58 n.19.




2. The March 2010 CFSAN 1 89 Warning Letters
FDA issued a blitz of warning letters in February 2010 to seven-
teen food manufacturers, alleging violations of various labeling
rules.' 90 While some speculated that letters sent throughout the pre-
vious year were intended to send a message to the food industry, this
time FDA was explicit: accompanying the letters were a press release,
a letter to the industry, and a webpage describing FDA's expectation
that food manufacturers will reevaluate their practices in light of the
agency's actions. 191
Several of these letters raised serious constitutional issues. A
number cited manufacturers for using a nutrient content claim relating
to antioxidants that allegedly did not comply with FDA's regulations
exactly. 192 Specifically, the agency contended that under 21 CFR
101.54(g), a nutrient content claim that characterizes the level of anti-
oxidant nutrients present in a food may be used on a label or in the
labeling of that food only when, among other requirements, a refer-
ence daily intake (RDI) has been established for each of the nutrients.
193 This would be the case even if the substance in question is indis-
putably an antioxidant, and the manufacturer's characterization (e.g.,
"high levels") is indisputably correct.
Several constitutional problems exist with this policy. A nutrient
content claim for an antioxidant without an RDI could be misleading
if the claim itself is inaccurate-for example, if the substance in ques-
tion is not an antioxidant, or the level present in the food is not as the
manufacturer characterizes it. But FDA's policy assumes that all anti-
oxidant nutrient content claims are inaccurate unless they are tied to
an RDI nutrient. Unfortunately, FDA's nutritional labeling require-
ments can be a crude and outdated measure of scientific validity. For
example, the Institute of Medicine recently questioned whether so-
dium's Daily Value of 2,300 mg is an appropriate daily intake lev-
18 CFSAN is the acronym for the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutri-
tion.
19 Warning Letters, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202859.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
' New Front-of-Package Labeling Initiative, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ucm202726.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2011).
192 E.g., Letter from Roberta Wagner, Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. for
Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, to Arthur Driscoll, President & CEO Sunsweet
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el. 194 Like many of FDA's speech suppression policies, the nutrient
content claim regulation suppresses all speech that does not receive
the agency's blessing. Under the Central Hudson test, the agency
would have to show that this broad stroke approach is necessary to
further the goal of promoting accurate labeling. It almost certainly
could not meet this burden. 1 Just one of several less restrictive alter-
natives would be to require nutrient content claims for antioxidants
without RDIs to contain disclaimers stating that no FDA-recognized
daily intake for the nutrient is recognized.
The letters also continue FDA's prohibition on the citation of
scientific studies by food manufacturers-even on manufacturer web-
sites.196 FDA achieves this method of speech suppression by consider-
ing the citation of a study espousing a health benefit to be evidence
that the manufacturer is promoting the food product as a new drug.'9 7
This is similar to the approach the agency takes with respect to off-
label promotion of drugs and devices.198
Finally, the most disturbing aspect of the warning letters can be
found in a letter to a green tea manufacturer. 199 In a website section
entitled "Green Tea and the FDA: Who's Right?" the manufacturer
criticized FDA for rejecting a health claim on the benefit of green tea
on heart disease. 200 FDA took this discussion in the article, particular-
ly the argument in the article that studies support such a link, to be an
"unauthorized health claim." 2 0 1 What makes this worse than other
examples of FDA's speech suppression is the nature of the speech
involved: political. FDA's view appears to be that manufacturers can-
not criticize the agency's denial of their health claims on websites that
194 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, STRATEGIES TO REDUCE SODIUM INTAKE IN THE
UNITED STATES 225-28 (Jane E. Henney, Christine L Taylor & Caitlin S. Boon eds.
2010).
'9 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002).
9 E.g., Letter from Roberta Wagner, Dir., Office of Compliance, Ctr. for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Michael J Mendes, Pres. and Chief Exec. Di-
amond Food, Inc. (Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/ucm202825.htm.
" See id.
198 One warning letter recipient, green tea manufacturer Fleminger, recently
filed suit against the agency on First Amendment grounds. Shane Starling, Green Tea
Maker Battles "Government's Speech or None at All", AP-FOOD, July 28, 2010,
http://www.ap-foodtechnology.com/Formulation/Green-tea-maker-battles-
government-s-speech-or-none-at-all?utm source=RSS text news.
19 Letter from Roberta F. Wagner, Dir., Off. of Compliance, Ctr. for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition, to Mr. Douglas N. Farrell, General Manager, Redco






contain product information because such sites are subject to labeling
rules, and therefore any mention of the health claim is tantamount to
promoting the health claim. This type of speech restriction would be
subject to even greater constitutional scrutiny because it falls outside
of the commercial speech rules, meaning it would be almost certainly
unconstitutional. 202
C.Tobacco
The Tobacco Control Act contains a number of statutorily man-
dated speech restrictions and charges FDA with the task of enforcing
them. Although the FDA did not impose the Act's speech restrictions,
most of the controversial provisions were adopted from FDA's 1996
rule governing tobacco that the Supreme Court invalidated for lack of
statutory authority.
Some of these provisions have already been overturned in federal
court. In Commonwealth Brands v. United States, several major to-
bacco manufacturers brought an action against the United States
claiming, among other things, that a number of the Act's speech re-
strictions are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.203 Specifi-
cally, the suit challenged color restrictions on labeling and advertis-
ing, restrictions on sponsorship of events, merchandise restrictions,
the additional warning requirements, the modified risk tobacco prod-
ucts provision, the prohibition on claims implying FDA approval, and
204the ban on outdoor advertising.
Regarding the color restriction, the Act directed the FDA to
reissue regulations requiring labels and advertisements for tobacco
products to include only black text on a white background with no
graphics.205 The ban would not apply to magazine advertising if the
publication has only a small under-eighteen readership (which must
be demonstrated by the advertiser).206 In addition, the Act exempts
advertising in certain adult-only facilities.2 07 The district court found
that this restriction could not be justified under Central Hudson be-
cause "images of packages of their products, simple brand symbols,
and some uses of color communicate important commercial informa-
tion about their products, i.e., what the product is and who makes
202 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entrn't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973).
203 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
204 Id. at 522-36.
2 21 U.S.C. § 387a-l(a)(2) (2009); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32 (2010).
206 21 U.S.C. § 387a-l(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 1140.32(a)(2).
207 21 U.S.C. § 387a-l(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § I140.32(a)(1).
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it." 2 0 8 Because Congress could have exempted large categories of in-
nocuous images and colors-e.g., images that communicate brand
identity without creating a special appeal to children-the ban was too
broad and failed Central Hudson step four. 209
The court also invalidated a ban on claims implying FDA approv-
al. The Tobacco Control Act prohibits "any express or implied state-
ment or representation directed to consumers with respect to a tobacco
product" conveying that: "(1) the product is approved by [FDA]; (2)
[FDA] deems the product to be safe for use by consumers; (3) the
product is endorsed by [FDA] for use by consumers; or (4) the prod-
uct is safe or less harmful by virtue of . .. its regulation or inspection
by [FDA] . . . or . . .. its compliance with regulatory requirements set
by [FDA]." 2 10 The court reasoned that this prohibition was facially
unconstitutional because it brought within its scope statements by
journalists, doctors, scientists, politicians, and others-in other words,
it banned much more than commercial speech.21 '
The court passed on evaluating the Act's ban on outdoor advertis-
ing, finding that the matter would not be ripe until FDA promulgated
regulations,212 and it upheld the other challenged sections of the Act.
The court found that each of the remaining regulations were narrowly
tailored to further the interest in reducing smoking. For instance, the
court upheld the warning mandates-requiring 50 percent of the front
and rear panels of the packaging to include updated warnings-
because the government supported the enhanced size requirements
with evidence showing that young and poorly educated consumers
were less likely to apprehend the smaller, text-based warnings current-
213ly in use.
Both sides have appealed the decision.2 14 While it does not pro-
vide a terribly useful window into the FDA's current view on First
Amendment issues, especially given that the restrictions are statutory
in nature, the case does perhaps demonstrate the importance of but-
tressing speech restrictions with facts supporting their need. This is in
sharp contrast to FDA's method of litigating cases involving off-label
speech and health claims speech restrictions, discussed earlier in this
208 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
209 id.
210 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. 111-31, §
103(b)(13)(3)(tt), 123 Stat. 1776, 1834 (2009) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
331(tt)).
211 Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
212 Id. at 535-36.
213 Id. at 530-32.
214 See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, Nos. 10-5234,
10-5235 (6th Cir. 2009).
2011]1 141
HEALTH MA TRIX
essay, which the agency often attempts to support through conjecture
regarding the prohibited speech's effect on its regulatory scheme.
III. HOLDING THE AGENCY ACCOUNTABLE
Constitutional liberties are meaningless if they cannot be en-
forced. But that is exactly the situation FDA-regulated industries face
due to a myriad of practical and legal consequences discouraging the
exercise of constitutional rights. This reality, considered with the ex-
ecutive branch's responsibility to adhere to constitutional limitations
on its authority, provides reason for FDA to reexamine its speech-
related policies.
A. Pyrrhic Victories and Enormous Risk
Significant obstacles prevent regulated industries from effectively
contesting FDA speech restrictions. To begin, affirmative challenges
to FDA policies require substantial resources in terms of time and
money, and victories may not always justify the effort. Part of this
expense is due to the nature of high-stakes litigation, but much is also
due to the time it takes to litigate against FDA. The Pearson disputes,
for example, lasted from 1995 to 2002, during which time the agency
suffered at least four legal defeats. 2 15 And even fifteen years later, in
Alliance for Natural Health US v. Sebelius, it appears that FDA is still
running afoul of court mandates regarding health claims. 2 16 Another
notable example is the Washington Legal Foundation cases, in which,
after losing at the district court level, FDA mooted the case on appeal
by claiming that its position was simply a "safe harbor" outside of
which FDA would not necessarily take enforcement action.217 Even
after successful legal challenges, there is no guarantee that expended
litigation resources will actually result in the relief sought.
Further reasons are related to the risks that come with defending
an enforcement action brought by FDA and the Department of Justice.
First, there is the possibility of an enormous fine. Since 2004, for ex-
ample, the Justice Department has obtained $7 billion in fines from
criminal pleas and civil settlements from just seven pharmaceutical
companies.2 18
215 See Alliance for Natural Health U.S. v. Sibelius, 714 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52-55
(D.D.C. 2010).
216 Id. at 72.
217 Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F3d. 331, 336-37 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Carver, supra note 3, at 184.
218 David Evans, When Drug Maker's Profits Outweigh Penalties: Deceptive
Drug Marketing Put Patients at Risk, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2010, at G 1, available at
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Second, employees and executives of targeted companies face po-
tential criminal charges. In addition to cases like United States v. Ca-
ronia, in which the government targets company employees for their
own conduct, the government can seek misbranding charges against
executives through a vicarious-liability theory called the Park doc-
trine.219 Under this standard, the Government does not have to provide
proof of an individual defendant's intent to commit a violation to im-
pose criminal liability on the individual. Rather, the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that the individual had a re-
sponsible relationship to, or a responsible share in, the furtherance of
the transaction that caused the violation. 2 20 An FDA official recently
indicated that the agency intends to rely increasingly on Park doctrine
liability as an enforcement option in misbranding cases. 2 2 1
Third, pharmaceutical companies that are criminally convicted
face potential exclusion 22 2 and debarment 223 from participating in fed-
eral programs, described as a "virtual death sentence." 224 These firms
derive an estimated 30 to 40 percent of their revenue from sales to the
federal government (either directly to federal agencies or through
Medicare and Medicaid), and the loss of this revenue could bankrupt
225
even the strongest companies. Counterbalancing this factor, howev-
er, is the practical consideration that the government, too, cannot al-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/19/AR2010031905578.html.
219 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975) ("[T]he Government
establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a
finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly to correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to do so."); see
also John R. Fleder, The Park Criminal Liability Doctrine: Is it Dead or is it A waken-
ing?, FDLI UPDATE, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 48, 48-50 (2009), available at
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/FLEDERPARK.PDF (describing the use of the Park doc-
trine against executives of Purdue pharmaceuticals for misbranding of OxyContin).
220 Park, 421 U.S. at 673-74.
221 Anna Edney, Drugmaker CEOs May be Targets for U.S. FDA in Off-Label
Cases, Lawyer Says, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-14/drugmaker-executives-may-become-
targets-of-fda-for-off-label-promotions.html.
222 Exclusion can be mandatory (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2009); 42 C.F.R. §
1001.101 (2009)) or permissive (42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5
(2009); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.201 - 1001.1701 (2009)), depending on the crime with
which the company is charged.
223 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2010) (setting forth causes that justify debarment
from procurement programs, including a criminal offense in connection with obtain-
ing or performing a public contract).





ways afford to exclude these companies. In cases where a company
produces the only available therapy for a condition, exclusion and
debarment would deprive government beneficiaries of a needed drug.
An interesting twist to this dynamic is that the Office of Inspector
General of the Department of Health and Human Services, which
administers the exclusion provisions, recently required a parent corpo-
ration to divest itself of a subsidiary that pled guilty to a felony con-
viction.226
B. Encouraging Greater Compliance with the First Amendment
The trends described in this essay suggest that FDA gives insuffi-
cient consideration to First Amendment issues when engaging in en-
forcement activities. In fact, the new administration reduced the
amount of legal review given to enforcement letters, reserving review
by the Office of Chief Counsel for letters raising "significant legal
issues."227 Some untitled letters challenging the content of advertising
are not subject to any legal review by FDA's attorneys. This practice
allows FDA employees without legal training to impose significant
speech restrictions through informal and indiscriminate means.
Even where legal review is certain, such as in litigation or rule-
making, FDA's recent practices suggest that the agency's view of the
First Amendment is very different from the view of the courts. As a
creature of the Constitution, the executive branch has a responsibility
to ensure that actions are consistent with constitutional limitations; it
should not rely on the courts to tell it when it has gone too far. Al-
though FDA justifiably seeks for all product claims to be supported by
sound science, the agency knows that the First Amendment does not
always require one to produce adequate and well controlled clinical
studies as a condition of speaking.
The agency could take two important steps. First, starting as soon
as practicable, the agency should publicly state that the Office of
Chief Counsel will review all enforcement letters-both untitled and
warning-that involve promotional or advertising issues for First
Amendment compliance. This robust legal review should also include
administrative proceedings that touch upon First Amendment issues,
226 Duff Wilson, Synthes to Divest a Subsidiary in Plea Deal Over Spinal
Surgeries, N.Y. TIMES PRESCRIPTIONS BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 6:18 PM),
http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/synthes-agrees-to-divest-a-
subsidiary-in-plea-deal-over-spinal-surgeries/.
227 Margaret Hamburg, Comm'r of Food and Drugs, Remarks on "Effective
Enforcement and Benefits to Public Health" at Food and Drug Law Institute (Aug. 6,
2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/ucml75983.htm; see
also Masoudi & Whittingham, supra note 170.
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such as denials of health claims. Serious thought about First Amend-
ment issues will not only help protect the industry's constitutional
rights, but it will also make the agency's positions in court more tena-
ble when challenges are filed.
Second, to aid in the above task, the agency should thoroughly as-
sess the impact of its regulations and policies on First Amendment
liberties. The groundwork for this process has already been laid. In
2002, FDA opened a public docket for comment on how the agency
could "ensure that its regulations, guidances, policies, and practices . .
. comply with the governing First Amendment case law." 228 Specifi-
cally, the agency asked: (1) whether it should apply different levels of
restriction toward different products (e.g., drugs versus foods); (2)
whether its positions on direct-to-consumer communications were
empirically and legally sound; (3) whether claims for foods should be
distinguished from dietary supplements; (4) whether disclaimers
should be required to share equal prominence with claims; (5) how
warnings can be made most effective; (6) whether claims made in
advertising should be treated differently from claims on labels, and
whether the agency has more latitude to specify label content; (7) the
extent of the agency's ability to regulate off-label speech, and whether
such speech would affect the drug approval regulatory scheme; (8)
whether the agency's speech restrictions enhance public safety; and
(9) whether the agency should reconsider existing policies in light of
First Amendment rights. 2 29 Eight years later, these questions are not
only still relevant, but in fact offer a fairly comprehensive summary of
the constitutional defects in the agency's current policies. The agency
should reopen this docket, permit submitters to update their com-
ments, and seriously address the proposals it receives.
The result of this constitutional audit ideally would include at
least three tangible improvements. To begin, the agency should create
guidance for its employees regarding First Amendment limitations on
its enforcement powers, and it should carve out areas of enforcement
discretion that are necessary to bring its policies into immediate con-
stitutional compliance. Second, the agency should begin the process
of revising its current and proposed regulations and guidance docu-
ments to be in better compliance with the First Amendment. And fi-
nally, FDA should work with the Justice Department to produce a
joint policy statement that adopts a consistent and coherent interpreta-
tion of the laws and regulations governing drug and device promotion.
228 Request for Comment on First Amendment Issues, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,942,
34,942 (May 16, 2002).
229 Id. at 34,943-44.
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In performing these tasks, the agency should consider several
overarching First Amendment themes, all of which are highlighted by
the agency's recent enforcement discussed above:
* The agency should permit the use of disclaimers to re-
medy potentially misleading speech, unless the disclaimer
would be ineffective. Despite courts' instructions, the agency
maintains a number of outright speech bans with goals that
could be furthered by utilizing disclaimers instead. For exam-
ple, FDA's ban on nutrient content claims related to antioxi-
dants for which there is no daily value could be furthered by
requiring marketers to feature a disclaimer that the antioxidant
to which the claim refers does not have an established RDI.
* Concerns that speech is inherently misleading, or that
disclaimers would be ineffective, should be supported by
actual evidence of harm and not speculation. FDA expects
that consumers will understand and digest the relatively thick
and technical "brief summary" offered in drug advertising, yet
at the same time argued in Alliance for Natural Health US v.
Sebelius that the phrase "anticarcinogenic effects" would be
inherently misleading (and thus incurable by disclaimer) be-
cause the products were shown to have an effect on some, but
not all cancers. Not surprisingly, FDA takes a pessimistic
view of consumers when justifying its speech bans. The reali-
ty is that different messages will have different effects on dif-
ferent audiences, and courts have been emphatic of the need
to provide evidence that a particular example of speech will
mislead. Simply put, when FDA seeks to ban speech as mis-
leading, it must meet its burden to show that the speech will
in fact mislead.
* FDA should not attempt to avoid constitutional issues
by re-characterizing bans on speech as bans on conduct.
For example, the agency justifies its prohibition against the
use of studies regarding disease-reduction benefits in food
promotion by taking the position that it has the authority to
regulate drugs, and food marketers choose to position their
products as drugs by citing clinical studies. But subjecting
such studies to the evidentiary standard for approval of a drug
operates as an outright ban on their use in the food context.
Typically, these studies do not meet the evidentiary standard
for approval of a drug. And further, if they did, approval as a
drug would mean that the article in question would no longer
be regulated as food when using the claim.
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* FDA should issue guidance on Internet communication
that recognizes unique benefits and constraints of such
communication. Manufacturers of FDA-regulated products
cannot take full advantage of the power of the Internet with-
out meaningful guidance that respects First Amendment
rights. For example, FDA could permit risk information in
space-constrained sponsored links to be accessible through a
mouse-click.
CONCLUSION
FDA's conflicts with the First Amendment continue to grow in
frequency and magnitude. FDA has taken unduly aggressive positions
in various enforcement actions aimed at drugs, food, and tobacco.
While the agency is rightfully attempting to protect the public from
misleading claims about these products, it has in some cases gone
beyond constitutional limits, chilling protected activities. The substan-
tial barriers to private enforcement of constitutional limitations-
including massive fines, vicarious liability, and exclusion from federal
programs-place the responsibility on FDA to regulate its own con-
duct. FDA should begin by reviewing all of its enforcement actions
for First Amendment compliance and, later, undertake a thorough
review of its regulations, guidance documents, and policies.
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